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Sanford Levinson’s dithering between constitutional faith and 
lack thereof is on target with regard to the promise extended by a 
written constitution.  My comments will not touch upon the 
mechanics of the American constitutional system that he has so 
masterfully analyzed.  Rather, I will respond to the question of Israel, 
mentioned but not developed in Levinson’s essay.  Constitutional 
theorists have at least enough faith to maintain the proposition that a 
written constitution is better than none at all;1 and Israel, it would 
seem, serves as a proverbial example of the failure to embrace one.2  
However, the case of Israel deserves a closer examination.  In fact, I 
will argue it is the attempt to foist the constitutional machinery of 
judicial review upon the legal and political system in Israel that can 
serve as an example of a lack of dexterity in constitutional politics. 
In 1948, the newly founded State of Israel adopted the 
outgoing British Mandatory Law as the law of the land, basic to its 
own legal system.3  Although this structure lacks a single 
constitutional document, it has developed, in time, a body of Basic 
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1 Patricia J. Woods, The Ideational Foundations of Israel‟s “Constitutional Revolution,” 
62 POL. RES. Q. 811, 816 (2009). 
2 SAMUEL SAGER, THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 34 (1985). 
3 SUZIE NAVOT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL 21 (Kluwer Law Int’l. 2007) (2007). 
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Laws and a robust tradition of court rulings on constitutional issues.4  
With regard to its political structure, Israel’s parliamentary system is 
a proportional one that is designed to be inclusive.5  However, due to 
a threshold that is too low, the Knesset has often been plagued by 
political fragmentation.6  The particular division of powers in the 
Israeli polity has thus led to legal strictures (e.g., Basic Laws and 
court precedents) on the one hand, and pragmatic principles (e.g., the 
infamous  “Status Quo” on religion and state) enabling coalition 
forming and governmental stability on the other.7  Over the past few 
decades, the two prongs of the system have balanced each other in 
the overall public character of the polity.8 
The two important axes that inform constitutional strife in 
Israel are: 
(1) The relation between the Jewish majority and 
Palestinian minority.9  This axis has been further 
acerbated since the de facto inclusion of the territories 
occupied in 1967 in the life of the Israeli polity.10  Of 
the entire Palestinian population under Israeli rule, 
only a portion of these Palestinians are citizens of 
Israel.11 
(2) The relation between the secular majority and 
religious minority within the Jewish population.12 
In their pull and push, these two axes define the fundamental 
challenge of Israeli constitutional work.13  A constitution seeking to 
 
                                                                                                                                      
4 Id. at 35. 
5 See SAGER, supra note 2, at 45 (describing Israel’s proportional system). 
6 See Marcia R. Gelpe, Planned Constitution Never Got Written, But Israel Still Got 
Constitutional Law, WM. MITCHELL MAG., Spring 1995, at 24, abstract available at 
http://open.wmitchell.edu/facsch/108 (discussing the presence of “many actively 
participating parties”). 
7 Id.; Kenneth D. Wald & Samuel Shye, Interreligious Conflict in Israel: The Group Basis 
of Conflicting Visions, 16 POL. BEHAV. 157, 159 (1994). 
8 See Gelpe, supra note 6; Wald & Shye, supra note 7 (discussing both aspects of the 
legal system). 
9 Nadim Rouhana, Israel and Its Arab Citizens: Predicaments in the Relationship Between 
Ethnic States and Ethnonational Minorities, 19 THIRD WORLD Q. 277, 281 (1998). 
10 Ruth Lapidoth, Jerusalem: The Legal and Political Background, JUSTICE, Autumn 1994, 
at 10, available at http://www.intjewishlawyers.org/main/files/Justice%20No.3%20Autumn1994.pdf. 
11 Yoav Peled, Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab 
Citizens of the Jewish State, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 435 (1992). 
12 Wald & Shye, supra note 7, at 160. 
13 Gelpe, supra note 6, at 23-24. 
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be inclusive of the Arab minorities would be seen to downplay the 
role of Jewish cultural and national hegemony in the constitution.14  
Inclusivity among the Jewish population between its secular and 
religious groups may seek to thicken their common Jewish values, 
which could further alienate non-Jewish components from civil 
society.15 
In terms of their substantive values, both Arab and Orthodox 
Jewish citizens may share a suspicion or questioning of the 
legitimacy of secular nation-state sovereignty.16  But, in terms of 
parliamentary coalition-making, their status has been dramatically 
different; Arab parties (though not Arab members of the Knesset) 
have almost always remained in the opposition.17  The Arab citizens, 
though a significant ethnic and cultural minority, have still never 
been able to transcend this fact politically as a partner in 
government.18  On the other hand, Jewish religious—Orthodox— 
parties have for the most part preferred to join the coalition, whatever 
principled reservations they may have about the secular Zionist 
enterprise.19  In fact, the Orthodox parties have often been the 
tiebreakers in the system.20  Therefore, the Israeli parliamentary 
system has yielded a tradition of government whereby the Arab 
population has never succeeded in translating its numbers into 
governmental power, while the Jewish Orthodox parties have been 
advantaged in it.21  Cast in liberal terms we can say that the Israeli 
system has encouraged a curious mixture of tyranny by the Jewish 
majority with regard to certain civil rights of the Arab minority as 
well as tyranny by the Orthodox minority vis-à-vis the larger secular 
Jewish populace (especially with regard to personal status and 
marriage, which is overseen by the Orthodox state rabbinate since 
 
                                                                                                                                      
14 See Wald & Shye, supra note 7, at 159-60 (discussing the conflicting views regarding 
the implementation of Jewish law on the state). 
15 Nadim Rouhana & Asad Ghanem, The Crisis of Minorities in Ethnic States: The Case 
of Palestinian Citizens in Israel, 30 INT’L J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD. 321, 323 (1998). 
16 Id. at 328. 
17 See, e.g., Martin Edelman, The New Israeli Constitution, 36 MIDDLE E. STUD. 1, 8 
(2000). 
18 Rouhana & Ghanem, supra note 15, at 328-29. 
19 Edelman, supra note 17, at 3-4. 
20 Id. at 10.   
21 See, e.g., Rouhana & Ghanem, supra note 15, at 323 (discussing the purported lack of 
equality resulting from the proportional system). 
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there is no civil marriage in Israel).22 
These characteristics of Israeli polity set the stage for its 
unique constitutional politics.  The role of the Supreme Court in such 
a political system has traditionally been to serve as the arbitrator by 
representing the overlapping consensus among the various elements 
of civil society.23  The court here does not give voice to the 
foundational moment; instead, it is a voice of equity and fairness.24  
Rather than dictate a revelatory moment of constitutional 
decisiveness in legal space, it lends guidance in a highly politicized 
agora.25 
In 1992, the Knesset passed the important Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Freedom.26  Chief Justice Aharon Barak declared this 
event a “Constitutional Revolution” and then proceeded to argue that 
judicial review is analytically implied by the very concept of a 
“Basic” law.27  Barak’s opponents argued that the hard-earned 
parliamentary consensus enabling this legislation would actually be 
used by a bench typified by liberal judicial activism to undo the 
particular cultural and religious character of the Jewish public space 
of Israeli society.28  In terms of the politics of constitutional law in 
Israel, Barak’s self-proclaimed revolution seemed to have played into 
the hands of his opposition.29 
The attempt to utilize the Basic Laws to found an American 
style practice of legal supremacy came at the expense of marking the 
court as a side in the agora.30  Barak’s liberal activist rhetoric 
rendered the court no longer eligible to serve in its traditional role as 
supreme arbitrator.31  In 2000, the intifada undermined the court’s 
role when most needed to help heal the fracturing of the polity’s 
 
                                                                                                                                      
22 See, e.g., id.; Edelman, supra note 17, at 18-19. 
23 Edelman, supra note 17, at 10. 
24 Id. at 12. 
25 Id. at 10-12. 
26 Id. at 15. 
27 Id. at 16-17 (quoting Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal 
System as a Result of the Basic Laws and Its Effect on Procedural and Substantive Criminal 
Law, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 3, 3-4 (1997)). 
28 Edelman, supra note 17, at 19-20. 
29 Id. at 13. 
30 See Emily Bazelon, Let There Be Law, LEGAL AFF. (May/June 2002), 
http://legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2002/feature_bazelon_mayjun2002.msp.  
31 See Jeffrey M. Albert, Constitutional Adjudication Without a Constitution: The Case of 
Israel, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1245, 1249 (1969) (identifying the Knesset as “the state’s supreme 
legal body”). 
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legitimacy.32 
The state of Israel’s most serious problem is the weakness of 
its political will due to its fractured coalitional politics.33  The 
ongoing “tyranny of the [Orthodox] minority” including its 
disproportional access to goods in terms of distributive justice (e.g., 
draft exemption and institutional funding) and its dramatic turn to 
nationalist, and at times markedly racist, sentiments has contributed 
dramatically to an erosion of Israel’s civil society.34  Until this past 
Knesset, the only serious infringement of personal rights in Israeli 
law was that of mandated religious marriage and that could easily be 
amended by legislation enabling civil marriage.35  However, this 
significant minority has no interest in the liberal constitutional 
insurance of its right because the Knesset has proven the best 
purveyor of its privileges.36  The coalition between racist nationalism 
and Orthodoxy is the powerful drive of the present day Israeli right 
and has resulted in a flood of legislative initiatives strengthening 
nationalist indoctrination and curtailing freedom of speech.37  On the 
other hand, it is plausibly arguable that Barak’s judicial activism, 
acting as though there was a constitution when there was none, undid 
the crucial role of the court in a polity founded on a significant 
overlapping consensus.38  Tragically in its wake, we have witnessed 
the emergence of anti-liberal and racist legislation in the heart of the 
right’s agenda in Israel and not only or even primarily the religious 
right.39  The old issue of the status of halakhah in secular Israel has 
 
                                                                                                                                      
32 Jonathan Cook, The Myth of Israel‟s Liberal Supreme Court Exposed, MIDDLE E. RES. 
AND INFO. PROJECT (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero022312. 
33 Steven Plaut, The Supreme Need to Fix the Israeli Supreme Court, ISRAPUNDIT (Jan. 5, 
2012), http://www.israpundit.com/archives/42611. 
34 See Joshua Mitnick, Israel‟s Unity Government: A Bid to Represent the Majority, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 9, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2012/0509/Israel-s-unity-government-a-bid-to-represent-the-majority (discussing the 
issues created by proportional representation); see also Bazelon, supra note 30 
(exemplifying the tension between Orthodox and democratic principles in several court 
rulings). 
35 Raanan Ben-Zur, Aharon Barak: Don‟t Leave Marriage in Hands of Religious,  
YNETNEWS.COM (May 14, 2008), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3542718,00.html. 
36 Cf. Danny Danon, Democracy Is Alive and Kicking in the Knesset, THE JERUSALEM 
POST (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=257243. 
37 Bazelon, supra note 30. 
38 See Woods, supra note 1, at 811 (discussing Barak’s view that “every issue—including 
the political—is justiciable”). 
39 See, e.g., Donald Macintyre, „Racist‟ Marriage Law Upheld by Israel, COMMON 
DREAMS (May 15, 2006), http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0515-05.htm. 
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given place to a much more pernicious undertaking of unraveling its 
civil society.40  The neo-con Likud Party is very weak in its face and 
there is no longer a supreme court to act as a break.41 
Still, we recently have witnessed the court striking down the 
law addressing the exemption of ultra-Orthodox students from 
military service as unconstitutional.42  This might point to a 
reassertion of the court’s stature as supreme legal interpreter, even if 
no longer moral arbitrator, of Israeli civil society. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
40 See Albert, supra note 31, at 1261 (“[T]he short term prospects for broad invocation of 
Hebrew law as a source of constitutional principle are probably dim.”). 
41 Mitnick, supra note 34; Cook, supra note 32. 
42 Bill Steiden, Around the World, THE ATLANTA J. CONST., July 8, 2012, at 12A 2012 
WLNR 14207207. 
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